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Reason Without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity



We call beliefs reasonable or unreasonable, justified or unjustified. What does this indicate about belief? Does this imply that we are responsible for our beliefs and that we should be blamed for our unreasonable convictions? And does it imply that we are in control of our beliefs, that what we believe is up to us? Reason without Freedom argues that the major problems of epistemology have their roots in concerns about our control over and responsibility for our beliefs. David Owens focuses on the arguments of Descartes, Locke and Hume and presents a critical discussion of current trends in epistemology.


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12091121.6 Owe rAvailable

Detail Information

Series Title
International Library of Philosophy Series
Call Number
121.6 Owe r
Publisher Routledge : London & New York.,
Collation
viii + 199hlm: 15,5x23,5cm
Language
English
ISBN/ISSN
0-415-22389-X
Classification
121.6
Content Type
-
Media Type
-
Carrier Type
-
Edition
-
Subject(s)
Specific Detail Info
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