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Reason Without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity
We call beliefs reasonable or unreasonable, justified or unjustified. What does this indicate about belief? Does this imply that we are responsible for our beliefs and that we should be blamed for our unreasonable convictions? And does it imply that we are in control of our beliefs, that what we believe is up to us? Reason without Freedom argues that the major problems of epistemology have their roots in concerns about our control over and responsibility for our beliefs. David Owens focuses on the arguments of Descartes, Locke and Hume and presents a critical discussion of current trends in epistemology.
Availability
12091 | 121.6 Owe r | Available |
Detail Information
Series Title |
International Library of Philosophy Series
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Call Number |
121.6 Owe r
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Publisher | Routledge : London & New York., 2000 |
Collation |
viii + 199hlm: 15,5x23,5cm
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Language |
English
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ISBN/ISSN |
0-415-22389-X
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Classification |
121.6
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Content Type |
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Media Type |
-
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Carrier Type |
-
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Edition |
-
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Subject(s) | |
Specific Detail Info |
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Statement of Responsibility |
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Other version/related
No other version available