The Metaphysicians of Meaning takes a fresh look at these two seminal essays, challenging much of the accepted understanding of them. It forces us to reconsiders their author's grounds for advancing them which, as Gideon Makin their former theories? What, in their views at the time, were the theoretical alternatives and reasons for adopting these new solutions? Even when these questions have been clearly distinguished they have received only partial answers. Through a careful and historically sensitive examination of key passages in both essays, as well as of earlier work in Russell's case including material published only recently Makin offers new perspectives on both theories. He proposes that Russell's and Frege's deliberations concerning key notions such as 'proposition', 'sense' and 'thought' are novel form of doing metaphysics, and not of circumventing it by shifting attention to language. He also argues that these are inseparable from their author's occupation with the logicist enterprise in the philosophy of mathematics. Finally, the volume concludes that the shared ground between Russell and Frege is far greater than their differences.